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HJ THE SUPREllE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAII

------------------- ---------------------ELAINE DEVAULT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vCase No. 15532
ANTHONY MITCHELL, in his
capacity as Director of
the Utah Department of
Social Services,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the District
Court dismissing appellant's action wherein she sought to
overturn a decision of the Utah Department of Social
Services and its hearing examiner denying her application
for General Assistance.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, denied
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, thereby upholding the
determination of the Department of Social Services and
its hearing examiner.
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RELIEF SOUGHT OU APPEAL
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the decision
of the Third Judicial District Court in finding that
appellant was not entitled to receive General Assistance

under the regulations of the Department of Social
Services.
STATEHElJT OF FACTS
Appellant has stated that she accepts the facts as
found by tl:: i'f.'.:

~ j

e:-:aminer.

Those facts are summarizec

as follows:
1.

Appellant is residing with her daughter, her

ex-husband, and a friend of the family.
2.

All members of the family are residing in the

same household, all indirectly related except the one
frien3 and her children.
3.

The combined household consists of nine people.

4.

Appellant applied for General Assistance on

February 9, 1977.

A hearing was held on March 15, 1977,

and the application was denied.
According to appellant's complaint, she has been
living with her daughter, grandchildren and ex-husband
since February, 1977.

Although appellant contends that

she contributed some money to her daughter when she first
moved in, she had made no norc payments or contributions,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and she continues to reside in the household and eat
her

~eals

with the family.

Based upon these facts, the hearing examiner
concluded that appellant was not a separate

econo~ic

unit, and her application for General Assistance was
denied.
ARGUHENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S DETERMINATION THAT
APPELLANT 1'/AS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR GENERAL
ASSISTANCE vvAS CONSISTENT \VITH UTAH
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS AND l'lAS
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AS FOUND BY
THE HEARING EXA!-1INER.
A.

APPELLANT WAS NOT A SEPARATE
ECONOMIC UNIT AS DEFINED BY
DEPARnlENT REGULATIONS.

In order to qualify individually for General Assistance,
a person must be a separate "economic unit", which is
defined in Department of Social Services regulations as:
"One or more persons living together
in common quarters, purchasing and
preparing food together, with he
income of each individual being
available to the entire group for
their support, care and maintenance."
(Vol. II, Assistance Payments
Administration Manual) .
wnen the elements of this definition are considered
separately it is clear that appellant was not a separate
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economic unit, but rather was a memb0r of the economic
unit consisting of herself and other members of her
family who were all living together.

The corr.ponents

of this regulation are:
a.

"One or more persons living together in col'U1\on

quarters."

There is no

dispute that appellant was

living in common quarters with her daughter and exhusband.

There is no indication that the house was

dividec' ·;_,

-:~

:;,

--~_at<e

apartments.

The members of the

household all shared the same quarters, as would any
other family group.
b.

"Purchasing and preparing food together."

Appellant emphasizes that the hearing examiner did not
specifically find that the appellant and other members
of the household purchased and prepared food together.
There does not seem to be any evidence as to which
persons actually did do the grocery shopping and cooking,
or that any one person performed these tasks all the
time.

However, it is clear that the group did eat their

meals together.

Appellant was not expected to purchase,

store and prepare her own food, nor was this her actual
practice.

She lived and ate as a member of the larger

household group, not as a single economic unit.
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c.

"The incoQe of each individual being available

to the entire group for their support, care and maintenance."

Although appellant had no individual income

to contribute to the rest of the household, it is evident
from the circumstances described in the hearing examiner's
report that the incomes of other family or household
members were available for appellant's living needs.
Appellant was living in the home and eating meals.
It is obvious that other members of the household were
providing for her needs.

It is common knowledge that

every person in every household does not contribute an
income to the group.

For example, a woman who is not

employed outside of the home often does not contribute
an income.

She does, however, live in the house along

with Other members of the family, she eats meals with
theQ, and others bring in the income which provides for
her

needs.

It could not be argued that such a woman

was a separate

economic unit; she is one of the group

who together are an economic unit.

Similarly, the

appellant is a member of a household group who share
common living quarters as well as meals.

She is not

a separate economic unit.
The Department regulation found in Vol. II,
Assistance Payments Manual §262.3 provides that a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"General AssistancE: household" is:
"Any adults and emancipated persons
living toJcthcr in cun."non quarters
(except roo~ers, boarders and live-in
attendants) shall be considered as a
househould provided they live as an
economic unit."
As has been seen, appellant was, in fact,

living

with other adults in common quarters anC: they lived as
an economic unit.
as a sepO>rc;":c

-~,

She could not, therefore, be considere:

__ :ere::!. Assistance household, and her

application was properly denied.
Appellant's

arglli~ent

that the fair hearing decision

was not supported by the evidence at that hearing fails
because the mere fact that she could show boarder status
at one point did not make her a separate economic unit
under the applicable regulation.

Taking all the facts

and circumstances of appellant's unique situation together the fair hearing officer was justified in coneluding that the other members of the household \-:ere
helping to support the appellant by the mere fact of
having her in the home.
B.

DENIAL OF APPELLAtJT'S APPLICATION
I•IAS COUSISTEUT l-l!TH THE PURPOSE
OF UTAH'S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STATUTE.

Section 55-15a-l, Utah Code Annotated, states:
"It is the purpose of this act to provide
assistance to any person in Utah in need.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A person is in need and entitled to assistance if sufficient resources are not available for his use within the limitations
set forth herein and who otherwise qualifies."
The State of Utah provides public assistance for the
purpose of aiding those who are truly needy.

Public

assistance funds are not unlimited, and the Department
of Social Services must restrict payment of these funds
to persons who are actually in need.

The General Assistance

Program, which appellant applied for, is funded entirely
by the State, and there are no federal matching funds
available.

It is important, therefore, that General

Assistance funds be used only for the purposes stated
by the legislature.

As U.C.A. §55-15a-l, supra, states,

a person is in need if sufficient resources are not
available for his use.

In determining eligibility for

assistance, the Department must consider resources which
are actually available to an applicant.

In the present

case, resources of other family members are, in fact,
being made available to plaintiff.

The Department must

look at the facts as they exist at the time a person
applies for assistance, and if those facts show that
sufficient resources are available tothe applicant,
then she is ineligible for assistance and her application
rms t be denied.
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The State does not have the responsibility to give
public assistance to every person who, as an individual,
is poor.

As is stated in 79 Am Jur2d, Welfare Laws §55:
"Something more than absolute poverty is
essential to charge the state with the duty
to support. A person may be ever so destitute
of estate or ability to earn a livelihood, and
yet not be a pauper. For instance, he may be
cared for by the voluntary action of fri0nds
or relatives, or the duty to care for him may
by law be cast on relatives, for it has been
held that persons having relatives able to
support, them and willing or legally liable
to do so, cannot be treated as paupers."

Appella~~

on her family,

a~~-as

a~d

that she would not have to depend

could establish herself as an economic

unit, if she received a General Assistance grant.

HoHeve:

it is not the purpose of public assistance to provide
someone with the means to become a separate economic unit.
There may be many people living in a house with other
members of a familv who would prefer to be able to live
separately.

But it is not the state's business to

provi~

every such person with the means to gain independence.
To approve appellant's application for assistance
would defeat the purpose of the public assistance statute,
which is to provide aid for the truly needy.

The limited

funds which are available for General Assistance cannot
justifiably be expended for aid to someone in appellant's
present circumstances.
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POINT II
RESPONDENT DETERMINED APPELLANT'S
ELIGIBILITY CORRECTLY AS TO TIME.
Appellant raises an issue not considered below to
the effect that her eligibility was evaluated as of the
time of the hearing rather than as of thetimeof the
application.

This issue cannot be properly raised on

appeal of course, but even so the hearing examiner
was acting within his discretion to find that a onetime payment of room and board prior to application did
not materially affect appellant's status as part of a
larger economic unit.

Even if appellant were correct

on this point and could properly raise it now, she would
only be deemed eligible for a one time grant.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS Ill
RESPONDENT'S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT
HAS INELIGIBLE FOR GENERAL ASSISTANCE.
Appellant claims that respondent created an irrebuttable
presumption that appellant's relatives provided her with
support and maintenance merely because of their familial
relationship.

No such presumption was in fact created,

nor was such a presumption necessary to respondent's
determination.

The Department of Social Services did not
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presume that her relatives' resources would be avail,ble
to appellant, the facts showed that the resources actually
were available because appellant actually was being
sheltered by her family members.

Admittedly a

determination of eligibility for public assistance must
be based on income and resources that are actually
available for the support and maintenance of the
Lewis v. Martin, 398 U.S. 555

u.s.

309 (l%2'.

~'-

applica~.

(1970); King v. Smith, 392

Lewis v. Hartin, supra, the Supreme

Court considered the question whether or not the income
of a "man in-the-house", or a stepfather with no legal
duty of support, could be considered in determining
eligibility for AFDC.

It was held that because there

was no legal duty of support, the income of such persons
could not be presumed available for the support of the
children, but if the income was actually available, it
could be considered in determining eligibility.
same concept applies in the present case.

The

Appellant's

daughter and ex-husband apparently had no legally
enforceable duty to provide for her support and maintenance, and it cannot be presumed that they would offer
support.

Nevertheless, the facts show that the other

family members~ providing for appellant's support,
their resources were actually available to her.

Therefore,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellant was not eligible for General Assistance,
and her application was properly denied.
POINT IV
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S APPLICATION WAS
NOT A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION.
No artificial or arbitrary classification was made
by the Department of Social Services in considering
appellant's application for General Assistance.

Appellant's

individual circumstances were the only criteria used in
determining that she was ineligible.

Appellant claims

that General Assistance applicants are divided into two
classes:

( 1) those who are otherwise· eligible for

General Assistance, are financially able to maintain a
separate residence, and are not denied General Assistance;
and (2) those who are otherwise eligible for General
Assistance, but are not financially able to maintain a
separate residence, and are denied General Assistance.
Appellant was not denied General Assistance because
she was unable to maintain a separate residence, but
rather because her circumstances at the time of the
application indicated that there were sufficient resources
available for her support and maintenance.

She was not

"otherwise eligible" for General Assistance, and so she
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did not fit into the class des~ribe8 even if such a
classification existed.
The United States

Supre~e

C0urt has

ofte~

saic,

"The Constitution does not provi~e judicial re~edies
for every social and ec0nomic ill' .
405

u.s.

56, 74

(1972), and San Antonio School District

v. Rodriauez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
Dandridge v. \·:illia-·s,
Court held

tta~

the anount of ar.
did not violate

Lincsev v. l:orT>.et,

~

397 U.S.

~r~=~

_:_:occ
t~e

471

Furtherr.::>re, ir.
(1970), the

Sup~e::1e

welfare regulation which lioited

grant regardless of fanily size

equal protection clause.

The Court

said:
"[T]he intractable econonic, social,
and ever. philosophical proble~s pr~sented
by public Helfare assistance prograrr.s are
not the business of this Court.
~he
Constitution nay inpose certain procedural
safeguc:.~ds upo:1 systems of \·.'elfare adrnj r:istration, [citations ooitted].
But the
Constitution does not empower this Court
to second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of
allocating limited public welfare funds
among the oyriad of potential recipients."
397 U.S. at 488.
Every denial of an application for public assistance
does ~ot create constitutional proble~s.

Sc2ee sta;,dards

and regulations must be established to insure that only
those who are genuinely in need are gra~ted assista~ce.
In the present case, appellant simply did not meet
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eligibility requirements; she was provided with food
and shelter and was not in need according to Utah
statutes and regulations.

Hence, her application was

denied, and that denial simply does not raise a constitutional question.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S APPLICATION HAS NOT DENIED
DUE TO HER FANILIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
OTHERS IN THE HOUSEHOLD.
Despite appellant's protestations to the contrary,
her familial relationship with other members of the
household was not determinative in the denial of her
application for assistance.

As appellant states on

page 8 of her Brief, the primary question to be asked
in connection with an application is, "Is the applicant
needy?"

In answering that question in this particular

case, the Department had to consider the following facts:
(1) appellant was being supplied with shelter;
appellant was being supplied with food;

(2)

(3) no specific

arrangements for payment for these services had been
made; and (4) no demand for payment had been made nor
had a time limit been established after which the services
would be discontinued.

Upon these facts, the answer to

the question is clearly that the appellant, at the time
she applied for assistance, was not needy.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The only sig~ificance o£ the familial relationship
in this case was that it typified the situation.

As

in many other families, all meniliers do not contribute
an equal share toward the living expenses of the household.

A good example is the twenty-four year old son

who lives with his parents, is unemployed, and contributes
nothing toward his room and board.
parents

:or~··ic.

li.

Nonetheless, his

,.,ith food, shelter, even clothing,

althougn tney are not legally bound to do so.

Such a

person could not be considered needy for purposes of
public assistance eligibility.

Likewise, the appellant

was not needy when she applied for assistance.

lvhether

or not her relatives had a legal duty to provide her
support, the facts shm.; that they were doing so.

Their

familial relationship may have prompted appellant's
daughter and former husband to provide support, but if
they were unrelatec and the same situation existed, the
applicant would still have been denied.
The facts show that the people with whom appellant
was living were able and willing to support her.

That

she was related to those persons makes the situation
more understandable, but was not the determinative
factor in the Department's denial of her application
for public assistance.
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CONCLUSIO;-J
There has been no showing that the lower court
errec in it's determination of law in this case.

The

facts support the decision made by the hearing examiner
for the Department of Social Services, and the lower
court correctly upheld that decision.

Appellant's

application for General Assistance was denied because
she did not live as a separate economic unit, but
rather was a member of a larger household where she
was provided with support and maintenance.

This

denial was consistent with state statutes and regulations,
and also with the Utah and United States ConstitutionE.
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT 13. HAHSEN
Attorney General
PAUL M. TI!JKER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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